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Sean D. Murphy'
Introduction

A

n aspect of US military involvem ent in Afghanistan since 200 1 has been the
use of cross-border US operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan, undertaken for the purposes of striking at the camps, compounds, and convoys of AI

Qaeda and Taliban elements based in Pakistan, and of defending against crossborder attacks and in filtration by those militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
As a matter of scale, US cross-border operations are far less momentous than operations that seek to topple a de jure governm ent (as occurred when the United States
intervened in Iraq in 2003, ousting the government of Saddam Hussein) or a de
facto government (as occurred when the United States intervened in Afghanistan
in 2001, dis placing the largely-unrecognized government of the Taliban). Nevertheless, these smaller-scale cross-border attacks on no n-State actors, though they
entail less intrusive and m ore tem porary projections of force, implicate important
issues of sovereignty, stability, and self-defense, and raise difficult q uestions about
the role oflaw in regulating low-intensity conflict.
This article discusses the nature of these cross-border operations for the purpose of assessing their legality under the jus ad bellum, meaning their consistency
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The International Legality of US Military Cross-Border Operations
with the norms embodied in Articles 2( 4) and 51 of the UN Charter. Attention is
devoted to unpacking the complicated and evolving circumstances on the
ground, but the facts at issue in many instances are quite difficult to discern, and
hence can su pport only tentative legal conclusions. While the focus here will
principally be o n US operations from Afghan istan into Pakistan from 2002 to
the present, the analysis is relevant in other contexts as well , such as Turkey's
cross-border operations in northern Iraq against the Kurdistan Workers' Party or
Colombia's recent forays into Ecuador against the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia.
Among other things, this article assumes that analyzing the legality of US crossborder operations into Pakistan under thejus ad bellum is important to the United
States. US law and policy generally call for compliance with international law in the
conduct of US military operations. Further, US ability to secure the cooperation of
other States may turn on whether US operations are in compliance with intemational law. Support from US allies includes support from Pakistan itself, in that most
cargo and much fuel supporting the approximately thirty thousand US forces that
are based in landlocked Afghanistan transit through Pakistan.l Indeed, in September
2008 , the Pakistani government threatened to close down US supply routes into
Afghanistan in response to US cross-border operations, prompting the United
States to rethink its strategy in this area. 2 Broader US objectives of maintaining a
stable Pakistan-an objective arguably paramount for the United States in combating terrorism 3-may turn in part on internal Pakistani perceptions concerning
the legality of US conduct. Moreover, though adjudication of the legality of US
cross-border operations before an inter-State tribunal, such as the International
Court ofjustice, may not be likely, it is not impossible, and adverse rulings may affect the ability of the United States to maintain both domestic and international
support for its polides. 4 Finally, the State parties to the Rome StatuteS establishing
the International Criminal Court (ICC), at their review conference in 2010, may
activate the ICC's jurisdiction over the crim e of aggression, thereby potentially exposing US military personnel engaged in such cross-border operations to international criminal liability .6 For all these reasons, there is value in assessing the legality
of US cross-border operations against Pakistan under the jus ad bellum.

us Cross-Border Operations from Afghanistan to Pakistan
The Afghan-Pakistan Border in Law
The 2,250-kilometer-Iong border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was essentiallyestablished in 1893 by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, a civil servant and diplomat
of colonial British India. The purpose of the line (which became known as the
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"Durand Line") was to delimit British colonial holdings in India fro m Afghanistan,
since Pakistan did not yet exist as a nation-State. The standard account is that the
Durand Line was negotiated with and accepted by the Arnir of Afghanistan, Abdur
Rahman Khan, and when Pakistan achieved national independence in 1947, Pakistan succeeded to that border.7
The border, however, is not without some controversy. Given that the border divides the ancestral home of the Pashtun people, the Pashtuns have objected that the
border was imposed by a strong colonial power (Britain ) upon a weak State (Afghanistan), which was in no real position to object. In the years after Pakistani independence, Afghanistan began to voice a view that the Durand Line lapsed with the
end of the British colonial rule,s a position that essentially rejects the internationally
accepted principle of uti possedetis juris (which maintains that States newly formed
out of colonies should have the same borders that they had before their independence). The Afghan position is widely accepted within Afghanistan, but has gained
no traction in the international community, and would likely not be accepted by
any authoritative decisionmaker, such as the International Court of Justice. By
contrast, Pakistan has maintained that the border is oflongstanding legality, is fully
demarcated and largely follows a series of topographic features that provides fo r a
natural divide. 9
In short, the border as a legal construct is well known and accepted within the
international community. As such, arguments in favor of significant cross-border
operations cannot credibly be justified on grounds of uncertainty as to the location
of the border or genuinely disputed territory; other justifications are necessary.
The Afghan-Pakistan Border in Practice
While the location of the Afghan-Pakistani border is relatively well settled, the
functioning ofthat border as an effective barrier between the two States is far less
so. The movement of peoples across the border is generally unchecked, with sizable
populations of both Pashtuns and Baluch on both sides of the border moving freely
and engaged in extensive smuggling operations that predate 200 1. to The graphic l l
depicts the border area. On the Pakistani side of the border, there are certain
groups that are the object of US cross-border operations.
First, there are the remnants of AI Qaeda and other extremist Islamic "foreign
fighters" who fled across the border from Afghanistan after the US-led intervention in the fall of 200 1. US defense officials and independent analysts place the
number of AI Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan at somewhere between 150 and 500
persons.12 Osama Bin Laden is thought to be hiding among those fighters in the
Waziristan region of Pakistan, which is part of the Federally Administered Tribal
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Sean D. Murphy
Areas (FATA) immediately adjacent to the border,L3 but his whereabouts are not
confirmed.
Second, there are remnants of the Afghan Taliban regime (a predominately
Pashtun movement ) that also fled into Pakistan in late 200 1, but have reorganized
and experienced a resurgence in fomenting guerrilla resistance to the new Afghan
government and its foreign supporters, incl uding the United States.i4 At present,
Afghan insurgent groups based along the Afghan-Pakistani demarcation straddle
both sides of the border, engaging in classic guerrilla warfare by attacking targets
in Afghanistan and then retreating to mountain strongholds on both sides of the
border. ls
Third, there is Pakistan's own Taliban movement (called Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), led by Baitullah Mehsud, and consisting of a cluster ofPashtun tribes and
dans united principally by a shared goal of resistance to the Pakistani and US governments. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has established strongholds in North and
South Waziristan, and at present there are concerns about "Talibanization" of the
entire western region of Pakistan. While Pakistan 's Taliban is principally focused
on activities within Pakistan, it is also promoting fighting across the border with
US forces in Afghanistan. 16
The relationship among AI Qaeda, other militant groups, the Afghan Taliban
and the Taliban in Pakistan is not entirely transparent, but connections clearly do
exist. Many of the "foreign fighters" in the region take their guidance from senior
AI Qaeda leaders and serve as "trainers, shock troops, and surrogate leaders for
Taliban units in the field ."17 In this way, AI Qaeda is supporting militants who cross
the border into Afghanistan, as well as insurgent groups in Afghanistan, in their attacks on US and coalition forces, as well as the Afghan government. A recent
RAND report states:
AI Qaeda played a critical role in the [Afghan] insurgencyasa force multiplier, assisting
insurgent groups such as the Taliban at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
Groups such as the Taliban used support and training from jihadists to construct
increasingly sophisticated lEDs [improvised explosive devices], including IEDs with
remote-control detonato rs. For example, there were a handful of al Qaeda- run
training facilities and lED assembly facilities in such places as North and South
Waziristan.... aI Qaeda received operational and financial support from local clerics
and Taliban commanders in Waziristan.18

A Taliban commander characterized the Taliban and AI Qaeda in Pakistan as having "dose ties," while a US military intelligence offidal stated that "trying to separate Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan serves no purpose. It's like picking gray hairs
out of your head."19
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In recent testimony before the US Senate Armed Service Committee, the Vice
Chairman of the loint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, testified that Islamic militant fighters crossing the border from the FATA region of Pakistan into
Afghanistan account for about 30-40 percent of the guerrilla attacks taking place in
Afghanistan against the Afghan government or its allies. 2o Further, those crossborder attacks (many of which are suicide attacks) from Afghanistan have been on
the rise, from twenty a month in March 2007 to fifty-three a month in April 2008,
with many attacks targeting troops from countries considering whether to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, such as Canada and the Netherlands.21 According to the RAND study:
Several factors can be attributed to the rise in suicide attacks. First, the Taliban
successfully tapped into the expertise and training of the broader jihadist community,
especially aI Qaeda. Jihadists imparted knowledge on suicide tactics to Afghan groups
through the Internet and in face-to-face visits. With aI Qaeda's assistance, these
militants helped supply a steady stream of suicide bombers. Second, aI Qaeda and the
Taliban concluded that suicide bombing was more efft'1;:tive than other tactics in killing
Afghan and coalition forces.22

The government of Pakistan generally does not control the FATA region , which
is divided into largely autonomous provinces loosely linked to Islamabad by means
of a "political agent" (a vestige of British colonialism). Indeed, the legal relationship is so attenuated that the ability ofthe Pakistani government, under Pakistani
law, to authorize US military actions in the FATA is not entirely clear. Consequently, prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the border areas were almost
entirely in the hands of local tribal groups. After 9/ 11 and the US-led intervention
in Afghanistan, the United States urged Pakistan's central government to exercise
greater control over the border areas, which resulted in the Pakistani army reluctantly conducting some counterterrorism operations in the FATA against Taliban
and AI Qaeda operatives. Those operations were not effec tive in eliminating militant groups and caused significant collateral civilian casualties that inflamed local
animosity toward the Pakistani government and army.23 Most military operations
have been left to the eighty-thousand-person "Frontier Corps," a poorly trained
and underfunded paramilitary force consisting of recruits from local Pashtun
tribes serving under regular Pakistani army officers. While these units have sometimes engaged in assaults on Taliban and AI Qaeda elements in the border areas,
there are credible reports (denied by the Pakistani government ) that elements of
the Frontier Corps are closely aligned with the Taliban. 24 In response to Pakistani
government military operations, the militant groups in the FATA began conducting a series of suicide attacks against various targets in other parts of Pakistan to
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show their strength and weaken the Pakistani government, though such attacks
may have undermined support for the militants within the Pakistani population.2S
Islamabad's efforts to "govern" the FATA have always entailed deals being
struck between the government, its regional authorities, or the Pakistani army and
the FATA tribal officials. In the post-9f I! period, the Pakistani government continued to pursue such deal making, including agreements not just with tribal
groups but with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan itself, addressing issues such as control
of the border areas, militant terrorist attacks within Pakistan and militant crossborder attacks into Afghanistan. 26 As such, the strategy of the central Pakistani
government in handling the western border areas has oscillated between military
action and negotiation.
The opaqueness of the relationship among the Pakistani Army, the Frontier
Corps and the militants in the FATA somewhat clouds the legal analysis that follows, since the cross-border militant attacks on Afghanistan might or might not be
viewed as attributable to the Pakistani government, either due to that government's outright collusion with the Taliban or its failure to take the steps necessary
to stop cross-border attacks. On the one hand, in some instances US intelligence
officials, as well as independent researchers, have concluded that the Pakistani government has provided direct support to militants for operations in Afghanistan,
such as logistical support for a militant car bombing at the Indian Embassy in
Kabul in July 2008, a charge denied by Pakistan. 2? In light of those conclusions, it is
no surprise that the Wasl,itlgtotl Post reported Central Intelligence Agency and US
military officials as saying that they "now withhold intelligence about the suspected
whereabouts of al-Qaeda commanders [in Pakistan J out of fear that the Pakistanis
might tip them off. "28
On the other hand, the Pakistani government's general indifference to militant
attacks across the border into Afghanistan probably lies less in tacit support for
those operations than in a simple belief that pursuing large-scale military operations in the FATA that kill Pashtuns, trample prior agreements providing for the
FATA autonomy and incur significant Pakistani army casualties would be extremely unpopular with the Pakistani population and ultimately ineffective in
stopping cross-border attacks. Moreover, some Pakistani officials apparently wish
to preserve the possibility of a "Taliban option,n one that might prove useful for future relations in Afghanistan.29 Whatever the reason, by mid-2008 the New York
Times was reporting that "Pakistani officials are making it increasingly clear that
they have no interest in stopping cross-border attacks by militants into Afghanistan, prompting a new level of frustration from Americans who see the infiltration
as a crucial strategic priority in the war in Afghanistan.n3Q
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us Cross-Border Operations into Pakistan
US cross-border operations into Pakistan to date have taken three forms: missile
strikes from Predator drones, defensive actions in immediate response to a crossborder raid from Pakistan and covert missions by special operations forces against
militant targets located deeper in Pakistan. Each should be considered separately
when analyzing their legality under the jus ad bellum.
First, the United States has engaged in attacks against what are believed to be AI
Qaeda and Taliban targets (such as training camps, compounds or convoys) in Pakistan, using Hellfire missiles launched from unmanned Predator aircraft. At least
some of those aircraft are reportedly kept at a secret base in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, such that these are not necessarily cross-border operations)l Further, the Pakistani government apparently has tacitly agreed that these strikes may be
undertaken without specific consent to each operation, so long as they target "foreign fighters " and not Pakistani Taliban , though the existence of that tacit consent
is disputed.32 While the United States does not disclose its strikes, the Pakistani
government asserted that three strikes occurred in 2007, while eleven were conducted from January to August of2008,n with perhaps another dozen or more in
September and October.:l4 The strikes reportedly have had some success, killing
several senior AI Qaeda leaders.35 Yet they have also been blamed for the deaths of
dozens of civilians in Pakistan, collateral casualties that have fueled resentment
among Pakistanis toward the United States. If relations between the United States
and Pakistan were to deteriorate, and Predator aircraft were no longer allowed to
be launched from within Pakistan, then presumably such aircraft might be based in
Afghanistan for the purpose of undertaking cross-border missions into Pakistan.
Second, while US military forces engaged in military operations in Afghanistan
are generally prohibited from crossing or firing into Pakistan, their rules of engagement apparently allow them to do so as a matterof"hot pursuit" when engaging in
self-defense.36 Hence, when US forces come under attack from militants (either
by artillery fire from Pakistan or by militant units who cross over the border from
Pakistan), US forces have responded forcibly against the militants both in Afghanistan and through pursuit of the militants back into Pakistan. For example, in June
2008, US officials asserted that Taliban fighters from Pakistan crossed over the
border into Afghanistan (Kunar Province) and attacked US-led forces with
small-caliber weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. The US-led forces returned
fire, drove the militants back across the border, and then pursued them with US Air
Force fighter-bombers and a B-1 bomber, which dropped twelve gravity bombs on
them. Though US forces apparently alerted Pakistani forces in advance about the
intended airstrike, Pakistani Frontier Corps personnel were present at a border
checkpoint. Eleven were killed by the bombs (as were several of the militants),
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resulting in a strong protest by the Pakistani government that the US operation was
"a gross violation of the international border."37
The determination that an attack from Pakistan against US forces in Afghanistan has occurred or is occurring has proven somewhat elastic. Hence, in at least
one instance, when US forces received information that militants were on the
move in Pakistan and heading toward US forces in Afghanistan, US forces preemptivelyattacked the militants even before they crossed the border, including striking
a compound one mile within Pakistan with missiles. 3a
Third, US cross-border operations now apparently include covert missions by a
US joint special operations task force likely consisting of Navy SEAls and the
Army's Delta Force39 ) in pursuit of targets in Pakistan's tribal areas-missions not
undertaken in immediate response to a cross-border raid from Pakistan. Such missions reportedly were planned but not undertaken up until mid-2008, due to concerns about the likely success of such missions, the effect on relations with the
government of Pakistan , and the risks attendant to special forces being killed or
captured. 40 In July 2008, however, President Bush reportedly issued secret orders
for such operations to occur even in the absence of express and prior Pakistani government approval. According to the New York Times, which broke the story:
The new orders reflect concern about safe havens for al Qaeda and the Taliban inside
Pakistan, as well as an American view that Pakistan lacks the will and ability to combat
militants. They also illustrate lingering distrust of the Pakistani military and
intelligence agencies and a belief that some American operations had been
compromised once Pakistanis were advised of the details. ~l
On September 3, 2008, the first operation occurred, involving US Navy SEAls
crossing the border on helicopters, supported by an AC-130 gunship, landing in
Angor Adda (in the South Waziristan tribal agency), killing about two dozen suspected AI Qaeda fighters and then returning to Afghanistan by helicopter. ~2 Pakistani authorities strongly objected to the operation and threatened, if such attacks
continued, to cut off US supply lines through Pakistan to US forces in landlocked
Afghanistan.H
Potential Legal Bases for

us Cross-Border Operations

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides that "[a]11 Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations."« The three forms of cross-border (or,
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with respect to drone aircraft, potentially cross-border) operations noted in the
prior section would likely be regarded as violations of Article 2(4) in the absence
of some form of justification, for they entail military personnel or weapons entering Pakistani territory and inflicting considerable violence upon persons present in Pakistan and their property. There are, however, four potential bases for
justifying these cross-border operations under international law: (A) consent by
the Pakistani government, (B) authorization by the UN Security Council, (C) inherent self-defense against non-State actors operating from Pakistan or (0 ) inherent self-defense against Pakistan itself. Each justification is briefly discussed in
turn.
US Cross-Border Action Taken with the Con sen t of Pakistan
To the extent that the government of Pakistan has consented to US cross-border
military operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan, that consent obviates any
question about the legality of those operations under international law. Standard
rules on State responsibility accept that conduct does not violate an obligation to a
State if that State has consented to the conduct,·s and that view applies in the area
of the jus ad bellum as well. 46 While the legal justification for US cross-border operations appears heavily reliant on Pakistani consent, the existence of such consent to
the three forms of US cross-border operations discussed above is not at all clear or
may not prove enduring.
Media reports, largely based on off-the- record comments by senior US and Pakistani officials, indicate that Pakistan's civilian and military leadership are not
prepared publicly to support US cross-border operations into Pakistan..f 7 Yet that
lack of public consent does not mean that Pakistani consent does not exist. Surveying the background to US cross-border operations, the Washington Post has
noted that although Pakistan "formally protests such actions as a violation of its
sovereignty, the Pakistani government has generally looked the other way when the
CIA conducted Predator missions or US troops respond to cross-border attacks by
the Taliban."48 There may be internal documents or communications from the Pakistani government that darify such consent and, if so, the United States will be in a
strong position to establish the legality of these operations in whatever ven ue is
necessary, assuming such information can be made public. Certainly the Pakistani
government's knowledge of Predator drones being based in Pakistan, and its
knowledge that such aircraft are being used for missile strikes, presents a strong
picture of tacit consent so long as such knowledge can be established. However, if
the claim of the Pakistani government's consent is based solely on a belief that the
Pakistani government is "looking the other way," then establishing consent may be

118

Sean D. Murphy
difficult in the face of the various public protests about US cross-border actions
that have been made by Pakistan.
With respect to the more recent special operations missions, the New York
Times reported that a "senior American official said that the Pakistani government had privately assented to the general concept oflimited ground assaults by
Special Operations forces against significant militant targets, but that it did not
approve each mission."~9 Yet the public stance of the Pakistani government is that
such operations are not permitted.so In the wake of the September 3, 2008 crossborder operation by US Navy SEALs, and the adverse reaction of the Pakistani
army and public opinion to such raids, the Chief of the Army Staff, General
Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, asserted: "There is no question of any agreement or understanding with the coalition forces whereby they are allowed to conduct operations
on our side of the border. "51
Confusion about the existence of consent stems in part from the fractured nature of the Pakistani government. 52 The President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, is
the official head of State, while Prime Minister Syed YousafRaza Gillani is the head
of government. The President and his designees would normally be looked to for
Pakistani consent to the use of force by another State in Pakistan. Under Pakistani
law, the President appoints the Chief of the Army Staff, currently General Ashfaq
Parvez Kayani, an individual who might be seen as deputized to provide consent
on behalf of the President. Yet, at present, there is a considerable divide in views between President Zardari and the Army leadership, including over Pakistani consent to US cross-border operations.S3 The Army's disagreements with the civilian
leadership are not simply bureaucratic maneuvers; on several occasions the Army
has overthrown the President and Prime Minister, most recently in October 1999
when the Army deposed the elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, in a bloodless
coup.S4 Moreover, as indicated above, with the "Talibanization" ofthe western region, Pakistani sovereign power in the FAT A is almost de minimis, suggesting a nascent insurgency that already contests Islamabad's authority in the west and that
may ultimately contest it nationwide. Depending on how Pakistani politics unfold,
discerning consent solely from the President mayor may not reflect the true source
of sovereign power in Pakistan.
Even if sovereign consent may be discerned, there are disadvantages to the
United States in basing the jus ad bellum legality of its operations solely on the consent of the Pakistani government. That consent, whether given explicitly or implicitly, may be withdrawn at any time, unless it is expressed as a legally binding
commitment for a specified period of time. With the changes in leadership within
Pakistan in recent years, consent from the government cannot be relied upon as
steadfast. Moreover, consent may always be predicated on certain requirements,
119

The International Legality of US Military Cross-Border Operations
such as prior notification of a given action to the Pakistani government, which may
be difficult for time-sensitive operations or where concerns exist about maintaining confidentiality. Since the host government's consent only establishes the legality of action taken within the scope of the consent, any US operations taken outside
that scope will implicate Article 2(4) . For example, if it is true that Predator drone
strikes are only authorized for attacks against AI Qaeda or foreign fighters, then
pursuit of such strikes against the Taliban could be regarded as a violation of the jus

ad bellum.
Finally, while consent is a valid justification when it is received from a de jure
government fully in control of its territory, it might become invalid if that government no longer controls or only partially controls its territory. Traditional jus ad
bellum doctrine regards support fo r a government as pennissible until such point
as an internal insurgency has risen to the level of being a co-belligerent with the
government, at which point arguably the government is no longer "in a position to
invite assistance in the name of the state."55 Ifthe apparent "Talibanization" of the
western provinces of Pakistan continues apace, and spreads throughout Pakistan,
at some point the ability of the de jure government to consent to US cross-border
operations under international law may be regarded in the international community as insufficient to support the legality of those operations. 56
In short, consent of the Pakistani government is a strong legal justification for
the use of US Predator aircraft in Pakistan, so long as Pakistan continues to allow
them to be launched from a Pakistani base. US cross-border operations, however,
can only rely upon this justification if authoritative decisionmakers in Pakistan
have formally consented to the type of operation at issue, and so long as that consent remains intact. The facts publicly available suggest Pakistani tolerance of, but
not necessarily formal consent to, US cross-border operations undertaken in immediate response to attacks by militants staged from Pakistan. Even for theseoperations, Pakistan appears to expect notification and avoidance of actions that could
harm Pakistani forces or civilians. By contrast, Pakistan publicly appears to have
rejected cross-border operations by US special forces undertaken deeper in Pakistani territory and not in response to an immediate raid from Pakistan. Overall,
given the potential difficulty in proving the existence of Pakistani consent to US
cross-border operations, and the possibility of such consent ending, other justifications for US cross-border operations should be considered as well.

US Cross-Border Action Authorized by the UN Security Council
Assuming that Pakistani government consent cannot be found in support of all or
some of the US cross-border operations, an alternative basis for legality might be
pursued in the form of Security Council authorization. When acting under UN
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Charter Chapter VII, the Security Council is empowered to decide upon measures
necessary for maintaining or restoring peace and security, including measures that
are forcible in nature. 57 The Security Council has adopted several resolutions relating to Afghanistan in the aftermath of the attacks of911 1, but none of those resolutions appear to authorize US cross-border operations into Pakistan.
Prior to the overthrow of the de facto Afghan government of the Taliban, the Security Council adopted two resolutions that affirmed, in the context of the 9/11 attacks, the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense and the need "to
combat by all means" the "threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts."58 These resolutions did not constitute a Chapter VII authorization
from the Security Council to use force; rather, they were a confirmation of an inherent right of self-defense that preceded and was preserved through passage of the
resolutions. 59 The next subsection considers whether US cross-border operations
into Pakistan can be justified on the basis of individual or collective self-defense.
After the de facto Taliban government was overthrown in late 200 1, the United
Nations facilitated negotiations in Bonn, Germany to establish a framework and
timeline for the establishment of new Afghan political institutions. Moreover, Annex 1 of the Bonn Agreement provided that "the participants request the assistance
of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces," and requested
"the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force."60 In
Resolution 1386, the Security Council endorsed the Bonn Agreement and authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) "to
assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its
surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of
the United Nations can operate in a secure environment."61 The resolution also
called upon "Member States participating in the International Security Assistance
Force to provide assistance to help the Afghan Interim Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces. "62 Shortly thereafter,
the interim Afghan government concluded a bilateral agreement with the ISAF
concerning the size of the deployment and the tasks it would undertake. 63 In 2002,
the SecurityCouncil adopted Resolution 1413, authorizing "Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all necessary measures
to fulfill the mandate ofthe International Security Assistance Force."64 Subsequent
resolutions have extended ISAF's mandate temporallfSand geographically, such
as allowing ISAF
to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of
security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan
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Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international
civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts,
can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the
performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement. 66
From these instruments, it is apparent that the ISAF is a multinational security
force authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
The ISAF is not a UN force in the sense of being funded by, and under the commandand-control of, the United Nations; rather, it is a coalition of self-funding States
authorized by the Security Council to engage in specified tasks in Afghanistan.
Though the Security Council theoretically could authorize the ISAP to engage in
cross-border operations into Pakistan, no such authorization exists in any of the
Security Council resolutions either expressly or by implication. Indeed, while the
ISAP sees its mission as including efforts to defeat the threat of insurgency in Afghanistan, NATO's 2005 Operational Plan, as revised, provides that ISAF's mission
is the stabilization of Afghanistan, not counterterrorism. 67
US cross-border operations are not undertaken through the ISAF. Rather, such
operations occur as a part of the multinational coalition of States present in Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). US forces in Afghanistan for
OEF are deployed as Combined Joint Task Force--82 (CJTF-82), which is based at
Bagram Air Base. That task force reports to the US-led Combined Forces CommandAfghanistan, which is based in Kabul. CJTF-82 operates and supervises a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, which consists of special
operations forces. Yet there is also reportedly an "Other Coalition Forces" unit of
special operations forces, which does not report to CJTF-82. This latter, more secretive unit may be the one responsible for the covert US cross-border missions
into Pakistan.
In any event, all of these US forces deployed for OEF are separate from the US
forces deployed in support of the UN-mandated and NATO-led ISAF which, as
discussed above, is focused on providing security in Kabul and its surrounding areas for the Afghan government, and assisting the government in the establishment
and training of Afghan security and armed forces. The ISAF and OEF have completely separate mandates and missions, with the ISAF focusing on a stabilization
and security mission, while OEF focuses on the counterterrorism mission. None of
the Security Council resolutions discussed above relate to OEF and hence cannot
serve as a basis for a Security Council mandate for the United States to engage in
cross-border operations into Pakistan.
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us Cross-Border Action Taken in Self-Defense against Non-State Actors
A third basis for finding US cross-border operations into Pakistan permissible
underthejus ad bellum relies upon the United States' inherent right of self-defense
or its right to engage in collective self-defense at the request of Afghanistan. Article
51 of the UN Charter indicates that the prohibition on the use offorce embedded
in Article 2(4) may be overcome when acting in self-defense, since " [nlothing in
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security."68
In considering this basis, there are several key and perhaps troubling questions
that arise: What was the preceding use of force against which the United States is
defending? Does that preceding use of force rise to the level of an "armed attack"
within the meaning of UN Charter Article 51? Can the United States invoke Article
51 when defending against the conduct of a non-State actor? Are the US crossborder actions necessary and proportionate defensive responses? Each question is
discussed in turn.
WI,at Was the Preceding Use of Force against Wl,ieh the United States Is Defending?
There are two candidates for the preceding use of force to which the United States
is responding in self-defense. First, the United States might be seen today as still defending against Al Qaeda's attacks of9/ 11 (as well as perhaps other actions taken by
Al Qaeda globally against the United States, such as the 1998 bombing of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen) . If
the initial US invasion of Afghanistan was a permissible act of self-defense against
the perpetrators of9/I I, one designed to diminish or destroy Al Qaeda's network,
then cross-border operations today might be seen as part of a continuous process
to accomplish that objective, albeit years later. There has been no temporal interruption in the deployment of US forces for this purpose, nor has there been a geographic interruption given that Al Qaeda elements fled toward and across the
Pakistani border.
One complicating factor, however, arises from the use of cross-border operations
to diminish or destroy the Taliban instead of Al Qaeda . Even at the time of9/ I I,
there were some doubts expressed about the right of the United States to defend
against the 9/11 attacks by using force for the purpose of ousting and destroying the
Taliban. 69 While selective attacks on the Taliban that were necessary to defend US
forces hunting down Al Qaeda elements post-9/ II were squarely within the notion
of self-defending against Al Qaeda's 9/11 attacks, operations directed solely against
the Taliban were seen as more problematic, since the Taliban was not directly
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involved in the 9/ 11 attacks, in the sense of planning, funding, sending persons or
otherwise sponsoring those attacks.
An alternative preceding act triggering a right of US self-defense is the more recent cross-border raids into Afghanistan by militants based in Pakistan (mostly
Taliban, but with support from AI Qaeda and other foreign fighters) to strike at US
or coalition fo rces, or the government of Afghanistan. This approach does not emphasize the attacks of 9/ 11 but, rather, the contem porary cross-border operations
that are harming coalition and Afghan interests in Afghanistan. So long as Afghanistan has consented to the presence of US forces as a means of assisting Afghanistan
in defending against such attacks, US actions fall within the scope of either individual or collective self-defense, though they should be notified to the UN Security
Council in accordance with UN Charter Article 5 1. Afghan President Hamid
Karzai himselfhas asserted Afghanistan's right to defend itself from such attacks by
crossing the border into Pakistan and destroying "terrorist nests. "70 H ere, though,
the complicating factor is the converse of that noted above; to the extent that the
Taliban is principally responsible for such cross-border operations, then it is its
conduct that may be seen as triggering a right of self-defense and it is its conduct
against which defensive measures may be taken. Only to the extent that AI Qaeda is
engaged in the cross-border attacks into Afghanistan can US defensive responses
against those attacks target AI Qaeda elements.
The upshot is that the preceding acts at issue may be a hybrid. US cross-border
actions against AI Qaeda in the form of covert special forces missions (as well as
Predator attacks when launched from Afghanistan) are probably best viewed as a
continuing defensive response to the attacks of 9/11, whereas actions against
Taliban and other militants infiltrating Afghanistan are best viewed as defensive responses against attacks occurring today on coalition forces in Afghanistan, as well
as the Afghan government.

Do Those Preceding Uses of Force Rise to the Level of an "Am/ed Attack" within the
Meaning of UN Charter Article 51?
Article 51, by its terms, preserves a pre-existing right of self defense " if an armed attack occurs." Scholars and States differ over whether such language necessarily requires that an "armed attack" occur before the resort to self-defen se,71 but
governments typically argue that such an attack has occurred whenever they resort
to self-defense.1 2 As such, a key question is whether the preceding actions that justify US cross-border operations rise to the level of being an "armed attack" within
the meaning of Article 51. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), the International Court of Justice provided some guidance on this point. On the one hand, a
124

Sean D. Murphy
State's deployment of regular armed forces across a border, or the sending by a
State of "armed bands, groups, irregulars o r mercenaries which carry out acts of
armed force," can constitute an armed attack; on the other hand, a State's "assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support" does not constitute an armed attack. 73 Hence, there is a sliding scale by which
one assesses the level of intrusiveness and gravity of the act at issue to determine
whether it rises to a level of "armed attack" that triggers a right of self-defense under Article 51 .
With respect to the preceding act of AI Qaeda's cond uct on 9/ 11, there should be
little doubt that such coercion constitutes an "armed attack," given the scale of destruction and loss of life that occurred, as well as the reactions of the United States
and relevant international organizations, all of which characterized the conduct as
attacks triggering a right of self-defense.7 4
With respect to the preceding act of Taliban cross-border operations into Afghanistan , the gravity of those actions to date are of a much different character, in
terms ofthe loss oflife and destruction . Nevertheless, as indicated previously, the
attacks are occurring at a rate of from twenty a month in March 2007 to fiftythree a month in April 2008, causing considerable injury and deaths to Afghans
and the coalition forces that are in Afghanistan with Afghan consent. While any
given cross-border raid into Afghanistan by militants from Pakistan might be said
to fall below the threshold of an armed attack, and instead constitute merely a
'"'frontier incident,"7S the cumulative effect of all these cross-border attacks by
militants would likely be seen as constituting an "arm ed attack" within the meaning of Article 51 .
Can the United States Invoke Article 51 When Defending against tile Conduct of a
Non-State Actor?
Article 2(4) prohibits uses offorce by one State against another State. Article 51 is
less clear in speaking solely to conduct between two States, since its language simply speaks of a UN member's inherent right of self-defense against an armed attack,
without indicating whether it is a State that must be undertaking that attack. Even
so, it might be argued that the Charter was designed solely to speak to rights and
obligations as between States, and any act of self-defense must be in response to an
armed attack committed by or attributable to another State.76 In the Military and
Paramilitary Activities case, the International Court of Justice regarded attribution
of non-State actor conduct to a State as the critical factor when weighing the
pennissibility of defensive action against that State, but did not directly address the
issue of defensive action against the non-State actor itself.17 However, in the Advisory
Opinion on the 1srae1i Wall, the Court-without much analysis-rejected Israel's
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claim that it was acting in self-defense against attacks by terrorist groups. The
Court opined that Israel could not be acting in self-defense under Article 51 because ( 1) Israel had not claimed that the terrorist attacks at issue were imputable to
a fo reign State and (2) those attacks were not transnational in nature, having occurred wholly within territory occupied by IsraeJ.78
If the advisory opinion is correctly interpreting the jus ad bellum, then it may
not be possible to engage in Article 51 self-defense against a non-State actor; rather,
self-defense is reserved for actions against another State, perhaps in situations
where the acts of the non-State actor have been imputed to that other State. The
Court's opinion, however, has been subjected to considerable criticism, much of
which notes the fact that the global community (including the Security Council,
NATO, and the Organization of American States (OAS)) appears to have regarded
the attacks by AI Qaeda of9/ 11 as justifying a response in self-defense. 19 Such criticisms may explain a possible retreat by the Court in its 2005 case concerning Armed
Activities on the Territory ofthe Congo. In that case, rather than repeat its legal position from the advisory opinion, the Court stated that, given the facts at issue in the
case, there was "no need to respond to the contentions of the Parties as to whether
and under what conditions contemporary international law provides for a right
of self-defense against large-scale attacks by irregular forces. "so Both Judges
Kooijmans and Simma stated in separate opinions that, if the Court still views Article 51 as restricted to self-defense only against an attack by another State, then the
Court is out of step with both the Security Council and State practice.8 ]
While this area of the law remains somewhat uncertain, the dominant trend in
contemporary interstate relations seems to favor the view that States accept or at
least tolerate acts of self-defense against a non-State actor. Turkey has engaged in
various cross-border operations against the Kurdish separatist guerrilla organization known as the Kurdistan Workers' Party,82 without being condemned by the
Security Council, General Assembly, or International Court. In early 2008, Colombian military forces bombed and crossed into Ecuador to attack guerrillas of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, which is regarded by Colombia as a terrorist and drug-trafficking organization. Again, none of the principal organs of the
United Nations criticized the action; while the Organization of American States
adopted a resolution declaring the Colombian raid to be a violation of Ecuador's
sovereignty, the OAS stopped short of expressly condemning Colombia. 83 Israel in
the summer of 2006 sent military forces into, and bombed portions of, southern
Lebanon in an effort to strike at the Hezbollah movement, which has operated out
of Lebanon to attack and kill Israeli nationals.84 Similarly, in early 2008, Israel
launched a major military ground operation, as well as airstrikes, against Hamas
fighters in the Gaza Strip.8S In neither instance did the principal UN organs declare
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the conduct unlawful self-defense. The United States undertook an airstrike inside
Syria in October 2008 reportedly to stem the flow of foreign figh ters and weapons
from that country into Iraq.86 As is the case for most customary law on the jus ad
bellllm norms, it is not possible to demonstrate through widespread and systematic
State practice that the concept of self-defense embraces action against non-State actors, but the better view appears to be that it does.

Are tile US Cross-Border Actions Necessary and Proportionate Defensive Responses?
Although Article 51 of the UN Charter does not expressly require that self-defense
be undertaken only as necessary and proportionate to the threat faced, those constraints present in customary international law on the use of force have been
deemed applicable to the post-Charter jlls ad bellllm. As the International Court of
Justice has stated:
The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of necessity
and proportionality is a rule of customary international law. As the Court stated in the
case concerning Military and Paramilitary Adivities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America): there is a "spedfic rule whereby self-defence
would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law" (I.e].
RefJDrts 1986, p. 94, para. 176). This dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of the
Charter, whatever the means of force employed 87

In considering whether force is "necessary," the International Court of1ustice
and scholars typically first consider whether there are peaceful alternatives to selfdefense, such as pursuing available diplomatic avenues. 88 This might entail determining whether the attacker has been asked to desist from further attacks and to
make reparation for injuries it has caused. Assuming that no reasonable alternative
means exist, the concept of " necessity" focuses on the nature of the target pursued
by the defender; where the target is the source (or one of the sources) of the threat
to the defender, it is considered necessary defense to attack that target. " Necessity"
does not require a defender to limit itselfto actions that merely repel an initial attack; a State may use force in self-defense to remove a continuing threat to fu ture
security,89 such as pursuing action against Japan in the 1940s until its militarist regime had capitulated. An example of a lack of necessity may be seen in the International Court of Justice's Oil Platforms case, where the Court found that the United
States did not complain to Iran about the military activities allegedly undertaken
from the platforms, nor prove that the platforms were the source of the threat to
the United States in the Gulf such that attacking them was necessary for eliminating that threat. 90
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"Proportionality" does not require that the fo rce be a mirror image of the initial
attack, or that the defensive actions be restricted to the particular geographic location in which the initial attack occurred. Rather than focus on the form, substance
or strength of the initial attack, proportionality calls for assessing the result sought
for eliminating that threat and the means being used to achieve that result. 91 As
suggested by Professor Roberto Ago, a rapporteur for the International Law Commission on the rules of State responsibility and later judge on the International
Court of Justice, "[ l In the case of action taken for the specific purpose of halting
and repelling an armed attack, this does not mean that the action should be more
or less commensurate with the attack. Its lawfulness cannot be measured except by
its capacity for achieving the desired result. ''92 Such reasoning is reflected in the national military manuals adopted by many States; for instance, the US Commander's
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations indicates that proportionality imposes a
"requirement that the use offorce be in all circumstances limited in intensity, duration, and scope to that which is reasonably required to counter the attack or
threat of attack and to ensure the contin ued safety of U.S. fo rces."93
In the Oil Platforms case, the International Court signaled that, if it were proved
that a shore-based missile had been launched by Iran against a US flag vessel, a proportionate defensive response could include destroying an Iranian oil platform
elsewhere in the Gulf, so long as the platform was shown to be engaged in assisting
attacks on US vessels in the Gulf. In other words, the Court found that a proportionate defensive response to a missile attack on a vessel was not limited to infliction of a missile attack in response, nor limited to the targeting of the facility from
which the missile was launched. At the same time, the Court stated that, in a situation where the attack consists of the single mining of a ship (which was damaged
but not sunk), a defensive response that destroys numerous vessels and aircraft of
the attacker, as well as oil platfonns, is disproportionate in scale to the threat. 94
While one might argue about the Court's treatment of the facts in that case, the
thrust of the Court's dicta was to consider the nature of the threat being faced by
the defender and whether the defensive conduct, by its nature and scale, was designed to eliminate that threat. Similarly, in Anned Activities on the Territory of tile
Congo, the Court indicated that the armed "taking of airports and towns many
hundreds of kilometers from [the defending State'sl border would not seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks it claimed had given rise to the right
of self-defence, nor to be necessary to that end. "95
In considering the necessity and proportionality of US cross-border operations
against Pakistan, it is important to focus on the two preceding threats that appear
to have prompted those operations: the attacks of9/ 11 and the more recent crossborder attacks from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
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First, the AI Qaeda attacks of9/l1 selVe as a preceding "armed attack" against
the United States triggering a right of self-defense in the form of operations designed to remove the threat of AI Qaeda. Given that for years the United States had
demanded that AI Qaeda desist from its activities and had sought extradition of Bin
Laden and his lieutenants from Afghanistan, and given that the 9/11 attacks were
attributable to planning, training and funding emanating from Afghanistan,% the
defensive response taken against AI Qaeda personnel and camps in Afghanistan is
properly regarded as both necessary and proportionate. 97
Yet most international obselVers or courts wouJd likely find that the same is not
true with respect to the ability of the United States to pursue defensive actions
against AI Qaeda across a national boundary into Pakistan or any other country.
Here the use of force in self-defense in response to the attacks of 9/ 11 would likely
be seen as both unnecessary and disproportionate, principally because Pakistan is a
third country that in no sense harbored AI Qaeda elements at the time of9/ll. Such
use offorce is unnecessary given Pakistan's stated willingness to ally itself with the
United States in its counterterrorism efforts to strike at AI Qaeda. The United
States no doubt disagrees and distrusts aspects of Pakistani policy on how best to
engage in counterterrorism; yet those disagreements alone do not provide the legal
justification for the United States to engage in unilateral uses offorce in Pakistan.
While working in conjunction with the Pakistani government is no doubt a difficult diplomatic challenge, most obselVers would likely say that it is an available avenue that makes the unilateral resort to force unnecessary.98
For similar reasons, the unilateral use of force to strike at AI Qaeda in Pakistan in
response to the 9/11 attacks wouJd be found disproportionate, in that the spatial
and temporal displacement of the threat of AI Qaeda to a different nation introduces important competing values, to wit the territorial integrity and political independence of a nation that did not knowingly support, sponsor or tolerate AI
Qaeda in the years preceding 9/1 1. The violence that invariably accompanies unilateral uses offorce, even those taken in self-defense, intrudes severely into the values of peace and stability to which Pakistan is entitled under the jus ad bellum, and
does so without justification when the targeted State bears no responsibility for the
initial armed attack against which defensive action is beingdeployed. 99 Certainly if
Osama Bin Laden were to turn up in a nation such as Bulgaria or Tunisia, that circumstance would introduce multiple new variables for any proportionality analysis, such that the United States could not rely on the same analysis that justified
intelVening in Afghanistan in 200 1. The same holds true for Pakistan, notwithstanding its existence as a neighbor to Afghanistan.
A final consideration is that, arguably, the threat to the United States from AI
Qaeda itselfhas changed since 9/11; the AI Qaeda now in Pakistan is a considerably
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reduced and weakened entity, one forced to hide out in the hills, with difficulty in
sustaining the same infrastructure it operated in Afghanistan. Some observers see
AI Qaeda as having mutated into an almost headless hydra, such that the real threat
of attacks to the United States now largely lies in numerous cells located worldwide.lOo If so, then the elements of AI Qaeda present in Afghanistan, including
Osama Bin Laden, remain dangerous, but may not be seen as operationally threatening the United States in the same manner as they did in 2001. Assuch, the defensive action that may be taken against those elements, in order to be proportionate,
could be viewed as of a lesser magnitude than what was regarded as permissible in
the immediate aftermath of9/ 11. Not all analysts, however, see the threat of AI
Qaeda as having changed so significantly since 91l 1. While there may be "a lowlevel probability that al Qaeda will be able to attack the United States in the next
five years," AI Qaeda even based along the Afghan-Pakistani border is still able to
train personnel for and direct attacks abroad, such as the July 2005 London bombings, the foiled August 2006 plot in the United Kingdom to blow up US airliners
with liquid explosives and AI Qaeda attacks in Iraq. 101
Could circumstances change in Pakistan that might generate a consensus favorable to the unilateral resort to armed force in Pakistan against AI Qaeda because the
latter represents a broad threat to US national security? Certainly if the same circumstances arose as existed at the time of9/11-with a radical Islamic government
in Islamabad, one hostile to the United States and with close connections to AI
Qaeda, resulting in a major AI Qaeda attack on the United States-then the unilateral use of force in self-defense against AI Qaeda in Pakistan would likely be seen as
justified, just as it was in Afghanistan in 200 I. A more difficult question might be
whether such force would be justified in the period prior to AI Qaeda in Pakistan's
attack on the United States, perhaps due to highly credible information concerning
an imminent attack. At present, however, Pakistan simply is not like Afghanistan
under the Taliban in 2001, and it is hoped that with proper support from the
United States and other allies, and avoidance of tactics that fuel militancy, Pakistan
will not descend to that level.
The second type of preceding armed attack are the cross-border raids by militants from Pakistan, principally Taliban but with support from AI Qaeda, against
US and coalition forces and the Afghan government in Afghanistan. Here the jus ad
bellum requirements of necessity and proportionality do not lend themselves to
broad conclusions, but do provide guidance for analyzing confrontations as they
arise along the border. For example, the necessity of US forces reacting to incursions by militants from Afghanistan will turn in part on whether the United States
has pursued and continues to pursue all avenues possible to obtain Pakistani government support for preventing such incursions. Responses by US forces to
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militant incursions will be regarded as necessary if it is evident that Pakistani authorities are unwilling or unable to stem such incursions fro m their territory. Further. responses by US forces that react to an actual raid by militants into
Afghanistan likely will be regarded as more necessary than those that act to interdict anticipated incursions. given that there is always uncertainty as to whether the
anticipated event will actually occur. Responses by us forces that react to incursions by directly and immediately targeting those militants. using force of a comparable nature and scale. likely will be regarded as more proportionate than responses
that target other militants in other places and times. using force of considerably
greater magnitude. though even the latter can be proportionate if designed to remove the overall threat of cross-border incursions from Pakistan.
A perhaps harder question concerns the necessity and proportionality of striking at AI Qaeda officials. camps or convoys as a response to AI Qaeda's support for
militant cross-border raids itllo Afghanistan. Such attacks are more removed temporally and spatially from the cross-border raids by militants. Yet if AI Qaeda is
providing training and other support for such raids. and in some instances even
commanding them. then most obselVers would likely regard it as proportionate to
the threat posed to respond by attacking persons and entities behind-the-lines directly associated with the raids. The facts of AI Qaeda's association with these
cross-border raids wouJd have to be well understood and the acts of self-defense
by the United States against AI Qaeda. in order to be proportionate. wouJd need to
be designed to prevent that association . As for whether such actions are necessary,
they are not necessary in the sense of providing immediate defense to US forces in
Afghanistan who are under attack, but they are necessary if it can be shown that, in
the absence of such actions. the cross-border raids from Pakistan will contin ue.
The distinction drawn here may seem meaningless, if it allows the United States
to strike at AI Qaeda not for purposes of responding to 9/11. but instead for purposes of responding to AI Qaeda's association with cross-border raids into Afghanistan. Yet the point is that while jus ad bellum requirements of proportionality and
necessity do not preclude US cross-border operations in response to raids by militants from Pakistan. nor attacks on AI Qaeda elements in support of those raids.
those requirements will likely be regarded as conditioning the manner in which the
US operations may be conducted. Rather than testing the necessity and proportionality of US operations against the threat posed by AI Qaeda from its attacks of
911 1. they must be tested against the threat posed by AI Qaeda in its association
with the cross-border raids. which, depending on the facts. can lead to considerable
differences in the scope and intensity of US measures that may be undertaken.
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us Cross-Border Action Taken in Self-Defense against Pakistan
At present, the United States has not regarded Pakistan itself as posing a threat to
the security of the United States, but this may change in the future. A5 discussed
above, while the Pakistani government's relationship with militant actors in the
western part of Pakistan is obscure, it is reasonably dear that Pakistan's interests
and objectives are not fully synchronized with those of the United States. Though
Pakistani officials seem to have no particular sympathy for AI Qaeda, the same is
not uniformly true with respect to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Over time, Pakistan's tolerance if not support for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan may lead to some
level of indirect support for AI Qaeda, which would place Pakistan at considerable
odds with US interests.
The jus ad bellum disfavors action taken in self-defense against a government
that is simply associated with a malfeasant non-State actor. The lesson of the Nicaragua case is that when a State simply harbors or even funds a bad actor, and that
bad actor engages in an act of extreme violence against another State, the first State
is not viewed as itselfhaving committed an armed attack against the attacked State.
Rules of State responsibility on the attribution of conduct to a State would require
the host State itself to order the bad actor to engage in the violent conduct, to empower the bad actor to act on the State's behalf, to endorse the violent conduct, or
perhaps to fail to prevent the violent conduct knowing that it was about to happen
and having the means to prevent it. 102 A5 such, imputing the armed attacks of AI
Qaeda or of the Taliban as being armed attacks of Pakistan would be a significant
leap, at least in the absence of far greater connections between the Pakistani government and those militants than is presently understood to exist.
Conclusion
To date, US cross-border operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan have taken
three forms: the use of Predator drones to target AI Qaeda fighters (although such
drones may be launched solely from within Pakistan ); the "hot pursuit" of militants who engaged in raids from Pakistan against US and allied forces in Afghanistan, as well as the Afghan government; and the deployment of special operations
forces into Pakistan as a means of striking at AI Qaeda.
These types of cross-border operations d early implicate the jus ad bellum, in
that they entail one State projecting highly coercive military force into another
State. Arguably Pakistan has consented to at least some of these types of cross-border
operations, but that consent is poorly documented, suffers from the conflicting
and diffuse sources of authority within the Pakistani government, and ultimately
ma y not endure given the vicissitudes of Pakistani domestic politics. As such,
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though consent is a powerful and useful basis for supporting the legality of US
cross-border o perations, other justifications shou1d be considered as well.
Assuming Pakistani consent is lacking, other justifications for US cross-border
operations must be considered. The UN Security Council has on several occasions
addressed the legality of foreign forces in Afghanistan. Yet the Security Council' s
Chapter VII resolutions are best seen as either authorizing the presence of a multinational fo rce designed to stabilize Afghanistan (without having as its mission
counterterrorism operations, let alone operations outside Afghanistan), or simply
recognizing the inheren t right of self-defense o f the United States and its allies. The
inherent right of self-defense (individual and collective) d oes justify US cross-border
operations that respond to raids b y militan ts from Pakistan into Afghanistan, so
long as the US operations remain necessary and proportionate to the threat of
those raids, and so long as the Afghan government consents to the presence of US
forces. Such self-defense would also support unilateral uses of US force against AI
Qaeda in Pakistan, in the form of either covert operations by special forces units or
the launching of Predators from Afghanistan to strike at targets in Pakistan, so long
as it can be shown that those AI Qaed a targets are ones that are supporting the
cross-border raids into Pakistan, and so long as Pakistan is unwilling or unable to
prevent AI Qaeda's support for those raids.
A broader right of self-defense against AI Qaeda targets in Pakistan based on the
attacks of9J II , however, is far m o re problematic, since the requirements ofnecessity and proportionality likely predude unilateral uses offorce against a third State
that was not implicated in those attacks. In general, the jus ad bellum recognizes
important rights of a defending State to maintain its security against the violence of
a non-State actor, but those values must coexist with the rights of other States to
their own security, rights that are not lost simply because the remnants of a dangero us non-State actor turn up on their territory. While circwnstances m ay change in
the future that could justify unilateral uses of US force against Pakistan for the
broader threat AI Qaeda poses to the United States, the jus ad bellum at present requires the United States, when pursuing that objective, to cooperate with the governm ent of Pakistan in finding and neutralizing AI Qaeda, not launch unilateral
attacks through covert missions and missile strikes by the United States without
Pakistani consent.
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